Session 3.1
India's and United State’s Strategic Approach to the Indo-Pacific
Chair: Dr Stephen Westcott
Dr Zach Cooper
Managing Multipolarity in the Indo-Pacific
Although experts sometimes frame developments in the Indo-Pacific as a competition between the United States and China or between democracies and autocracies, the reality in the region is much more complex. The region is not bipolar, but multipolar. As a result, countries are aligning differently on different issues at different times. Therefore, the key question is not whether certain countries are choosing sides with China or the United States. Rather, the central question is in which areas countries have similar views and alignments. To understand this, it is necessary to examine alignment choices across four issue areas: security, economics, technology, and global governance. In each area, the United States is trying to build coalitions around shared principles. These efforts, however, are nascent. The security coalition is perhaps the most developed but also the smallest. The economic coalition is larger, but U.S. leadership has been lacking. The technology coalition is fractured, with key players having very different views. And the global governance coalition, while the largest in principle, is struggling in practice. Whether the United States can succeed in building lasting coalitions in these four areas will determine the success or failure of America's Indo-Pacific strategy.
Prof. Arvind Kumar
United States' Strategy towards Indo-Pacific in the Emerging Dynamics of Geopolitics
The way the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) concept got unfolded especially in the last one decade in the changing dynamics of geopolitics has reflected changes in the strategic behavior of great powers in general and the US in particular, overall security situations and how these great powers have been attempting to create their sphere of influence. It is being acknowledged by the members of the international community that the United States, China and India are the ‘big Indo-Pacific three’. A major disruption anywhere in the region will have large repercussions for their interests and the future of Indo-Pacific will be strengthened or shaken by how they get along. The contemporary debates have mostly centred on how the United States’ has come up with their Indo-Pacific strategy by making geographical adjustments and adapting to the emerging geopolitical environment. The roots of the new Indo-Pacific may look economic but it seems that the consequences will be deeply strategic. Hence, addressing the probable consequences will remain complicated by the United States’. It must be emphasized here that the IPR is not going to be an ordinary geographic region. The engagement of United States’ with all the sub-regions in the broad based definition of Indo-Pacific will be very vital for peace and stability. The signing of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) during President Trump’s Administration in 2018 has obviously helped the United States’ establish a multifaceted strategy to promote their security and economic interests and values in the IPR.
The research paper will discuss the salient issues relating to China’s rise and whether it has posed concerns to build a stable Indo-Pacific Security Architecture. How the US has been able to build ties with the like- minded countries in the form of ‘QUAD’ will also be discussed. Whether ‘QUAD’ will emerge as a viable platform to deal with the growing concerns from China remains a major part of discourse. The research paper will also assess the probable future of Indo-Pacific and what role the US will play in making IPR a peaceful and stable one.
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Dr Seshadri Chari
Abstract Forthcoming
The Indo-Pacific as a Zone of Inclusion and Interaction: India's Vision
Commodore R S Vasan (retd)
India and the QUAD: Perceptions and Realities
From a reluctant partner in 2007 when QUAD 1.0 was a fledgling alliance, India has now endorsed the concept of QUAD 2.0 commencing 2017. The intervening period witnessed lukewarm response as if the QUAD was defunct. With the transgressions by PLA in the Himalayas along the LAC, China has pushed India and even Australia in to a tight embrace in the rejuvenated QUAD that seems to have a potential to put China under pressure in the maritime domain. While assessing the dynamics of QUAD and it's utility as a non-military alliance, it is important to know the views of the partners who seem to agree on engagements in many areas. How effective would the identified goals of ‘vaccine diplomacy’, Resilient Supply Chain Initiative, S&T collaboration etc., which are in the non-military domain help QUAD in achieving its objectives. What in the eyes of India are these goals and deliverables? If there is clarity in the selected objectives are they achievable? If so how? What needs to be done by India and other partners to make China conform to Rule Based Order (RBO) in the Indo Pacific. There is a lot of emphasis on Free and Open Indo Pacific that has included Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) by USA. India has not participated in the FONOPs while endorsing the need for RBO. What would be the response of India if Taiwan is attacked by China?
Dr Nanda Kishor
A Geopolitical Assessment of United States Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific was initially conceived as a geopolitical tool to bring freedom, prosperity, and stability to the region. However, at the same time, it has always been about balancing the rise of China and avoiding Chinese expansionism. The US has been striving to keep the Indo-Pacific as ‘free, open, inclusive region’ in pursuit of progress and prosperity. In this regard, there are several permutations and combinations the US needs to become a preponderant power. The hermeneutics of the US defining Indo-Pacific as an essential region for just free navigation has taken a back seat, and the Indo-Pacific strategy is a ‘priority theatre’ now. There was an impression among scholars and policymakers that there would be none to challenge China, and China would be the next Superpower. Even if Trump might not have succeed in stopping China becoming a superpower, for sure, he has hastened it by a decade at least and has laid a strong position for Biden administration. The conceived threefold strategy of Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promotion of a Networked Region is a welcome move. US’s open challenge to China by asserting that the US has many belts and many roads display its primacy as a Superpower, which none other than the US can assert at this juncture given the clout China enjoys in world politics. What defines the success of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific would be the ‘consistency, cooperation, and conduciveness’ it creates for its partners through the praxis of its ideas. It would be curious to see how things unfold in this highly unpredictable theatre with new vigour and robustness the US has been displaying.
Mr Uday N. Patil
U.S. Engagement in the Indo-Pacific from Obama to Biden: Determinants, Shifts and Prospects
Starting from President Obama addressing himself as the ‘Pacific President’, the U.S. since then has been particularly keen towards its engagement in the Indo-Pacific, especially in terms of the security architecture. The transition from the ‘Pivot to Asia’ to the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, the Indo-Pacific has literally become the number one geopolitical priority for the U.S. as it is being seen as the theatre of Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition. From the initial bilateral engagement with the important Asian players such as India, Japan and South Korea, the U.S. under Trump’s leadership ensured the revival of QUAD. The Biden administration has also been constantly vocal with regard to the cruciality of the Indo-Pacific on various national and international forums. Hence it becomes crucial to trace those major determinants contributed in this regard, how the nature of engagement evolved over a period of time and what could be the future prospects. This paper addresses the major determinants followed by shifts from the Obama administration to the Biden one in terms of the U.S. engagement special considering the security architecture. Tracing the trajectory of the U.S. engagement in the region, the paper will also try to identify the future prospects regarding the same.